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ABSTRACT

What are the laws of nature? Are they abstract entities that govern physical
processes? Or are they merely useful summaries that describe patterns in nature? In this
thesis, I explore offer arguments for the former view– what is known as inflationism
regarding laws of nature. It is my hope that by excavating and evaluating the role
epistemological concerns have played in this debate, we may find new avenues to break
this long standing metaphysical stalemate.
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Invisible things are the only realities.
(Edgar Allan Poe, "Loss of Breath”)
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INTRODUCTION
TO READ GOD’S MIND

My fingers push down the keys of my keyboard, you move your pupils, tracking
words on a page. All the while, gravity keeps us both from floating away. Do
the laws of nature govern these physical processes or are the laws merely
useful summaries? Here, I present arguments against the latter view-- which
I will refer to as deflationism regarding laws of nature. I focus in particular
on the Best-Systems Account (BSA), which I take to be the strongest form
of such theories.
By “laws of nature,” I am referring to the laws pursued by the natural
sciences, such as Newton’s Laws or the ideal gas laws. Arguably, the discovery of natural law is among
the key goals, if not the key goal of scientific inquiry. Thus, the importance of ascertaining “the nature
of a law of nature” is manifest.1 It seems when scientists speak of laws of nature, they do so without
unified consensus on what precisely this means. Certainly a physicist can point to examples of laws, but
there remains the question of their essential nature. Even beyond the sphere of philosophy of science,
the questions raised in this debate involving inference, explanation, intuition, and simplicity have
far-reaching importance. Inference from observed phenomena to unobserved explanations is “central to

1

Armstrong (1983), 4.
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our whole life as human beings.”2 The debate surrounding its reliability in this context concerns
everyone who’s ever made an inference (that is to say, everyone).
In a cosmological sense, the questions raised resonate even wider. From Plato to Lewis,
philosophers have long sought to “carve nature at its joints.” As early as 300 B.C., Euclid claimed the
“laws of nature are but the mathematical thoughts of God.” If so, this thesis is my attempt to read God’s
mind. Regardless of its theist underpinnings, the metaphor holds me in its grip. Whether what we
glimpse are the thoughts of God or the whims of random chance, understanding the laws of nature is
perhaps the key to understanding the structure of reality.
Traditionally, deflationism has often been defended in terms of empiricist epistemology. I will
identify a significant tension within this epistemologically-motivated deflationism with regard to its
treatment of abduction. Next, I will address more recent views that claim to move beyond this
epistemological motivation, such as that presented by Jonathan Schaffer. I contend that these views
ultimately rest on similar empirical assumptions, and therefore cannot escape the aforementioned
tension. Furthermore, their assertion of greater ontological economy fails due to the exigency of a
dependence relation to fulfill the explanatory role of laws.
In chapter one, I clarify the debate in more detail, focusing on the merits of the BSA in relation
to other deflationist accounts and the role abduction plays in these issues. In chapter two, I argue
against epistemologically-motivated deflationism, identifying an area of inconsistency with its use of
inference to best explanation. Next, in chapter three, I defend against certain forms of
non-epistemologically motivated deflationism, concluding that they may ultimately rely upon similar
2

Ibid.
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empiricist concerns. In chapter four, I argue for the explanatory advantages of inflationism and in five I
defend against an objection relating to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Finally, in chapter six, I
explore deflationism’s unintuitive and radical implications regarding our understandings of chance and
prediction.
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CHAPTER ONE
DEFLATIONISM AND THE BEST SYSTEM

The contending views on what a law of nature is, or more neutrally, what
a law of nature would be should such laws exist, fall broadly into two
categories: inflationism and deflationism .3 Inflationist accounts argue that
laws of nature are something over and above the mere regularities we observe
in nature. They are that which governs, or otherwise gives rise to the
regularities themselves.4 In contrast, deflationism generally posits that laws are nothing over and above
regularities observed in nature, upholding the Humean picture of reality as a mosaic of causally
vacuous content. On this view, laws describe the patterns we observe in nature, but do not in any way
give rise to them or serve any constraining function. Schaffer puts it vividly with an analogy to cinema:
“...the laws of nature are nothing over and above the pattern of events, just like a movie is nothing over
and above the sequence of frames.”5 To avoid presumption, I will refer to the deflationary notion of
laws as “D-laws” and inflationary notion as “I-laws,” but of course both parties believe they are
referring to the only existent laws.

3

Kreines (2017), 327. There are also anti-realist or eliminativist accounts of laws, which deny the existence of laws
whatsoever. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on realist accounts. I find these more attractive given their
accordance with scientific practice, which broadly seems to assume the existence of laws. I concur with Cohen and
Callender (2009) that “it is very hard to make sense of actual scientific practice and the history of science without invoking
laws of nature” (3).
4
Here, I mean “govern” in the sense presented by Beebee (2006) and Loewer (1996), among others.
5
Schaffer (2008), 82.
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Generally, the “best systems” account is taken to be the most sophisticated form of
deflationism, so that is the form I will address in this paper.6 BSA offers key advantages over other
deflationist theories in its accounting for a distinction between true laws and merely “accidental
regularities.” Early Humean accounts of laws, such as those Armstrong terms “naive regularity
theories,” stated simply that laws are universal truths that exist in nature.7 If that were the case, there
would be a great many laws of nature-- in fact an infinite number. It seems obvious that there is a
difference between the law of gravity and other regularities, such as “all people who read this paper are
interested in philosophy.” Let’s assume the latter is true and holds universally. Still, it would seem
absurd to conclude that it’s a law of nature. It seems at least intuitively important that there must be
some way to distinguish between the regularities that are merely “accidental” and those that have the
privileged status of lawhood.
In response, BSA posits that laws of nature are only those “universal truths” or regularities that
have been “appropriately axiomized.”8 According to Lewis, the appropriate axiomatization consists of
admitting only the regularities that contribute most to the “collective simplicity and strength” of the
system as a whole.9 By “strength,” I follow Loewer’s interpretation in taking Lewis to mean something
akin to “informativeness.”10 So even if universally true, the regularity that “all people who read this
paper are interested in philosophy” wouldn’t qualify for lawhood because it would not contribute to
the collective simplicity and strength of the system as a whole.

6

Armstrong (2016), 68.
Ibid, 10.
8
Dretske (1977), 253.
9
Lewis (1983), 367.
10
Loewer (2007), 106.
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Deflationism contends that there are no additional ingredients to reality; our ontology is
complete with the regularities themselves, and thus, laws are empirically accessible to science. Our
movie harbors no further mystery than the order of frames on the reel. In contrast, if inflationism is
true, this ostensibly implies a grim prognosis for scientific knowledge. If laws are something over and
above the regularities themselves, and we can only observe the regularities, how can we have knowledge
about said laws? Strict empiricism would suggest we can’t. If so, this is a significant disadvantage of
inflationist theories. Inflationism would suggest scientific inquiry cannot attain knowledge of laws. An
account of the laws of nature that defines them as incompatible with scientific inquiry seems
significantly less attractive.
However, the inflationist can seek recourse in abduction; the principle of inference to best
explanation (IBE) offers a route to salvage knowledge of laws. IBE states that we have reason to believe
the hypothesis that best explains a given body of evidence. Often, “best” is defined by certain
explanatory virtues such as simplicity and informational strength. By employing IBE, scientists could
attain knowledge about the laws despite their empirical inaccessibility. They would be able to observe
the regularities in nature and infer hypotheses about the laws that would best explain them. So, in part,
inflationism’s strength as an account hinges on the acceptance of IBE. Inflationism requires IBE to
defend the knowability of laws; it is the means by which science can attain knowledge about laws to
which we cannot have direct epistemological access.
This leaves the theory vulnerable to strict empiricist concerns. If the deflationist rejects the use
of IBE in this context, they can reject the possibility of knowledge of I-laws. Many deflationists take
this route, arguing that inflationism is epistemologically disadvantageous because it would preclude

12
knowledge of laws. I will refer to this argument as the “nomic knowledge attack.” Helen Beebee, a
proponent of the BSA, states that this concern with epistemological limits is foundational to
deflationist thought: “regularity theories take as their starting point the thought that we should not
take our causal talk to be talk about something.. too far removed from our experiential reach.”11
Similarly, Cohen and Callender claim that “ one of the main advantages” the BSA “has over its rivals is
that it makes lawhood epistemologically accessible.”12 Some, such as Van Fraassen, go as far as to reject
abduction as a truth conducive principle entirely. He claims that IBE “never warrants belief when the
potential explanation of the evidence stretches to the unobservable world.”13 If this is true, inflationism
would entail the unattractive notion that laws are not within the epistemological grasp of science.

11

Beebee (2006), 516.
Cohen and Calendar (2009), 10.
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CHAPTER TWO
A CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED
DEFLATIONISM
I will now argue that the Best Systems Account also requires a similar
abductive principle in its appeal to ontological economy. Therefore, even
the BSA- the strongest version of deflationism- faces an internal tension
with respect to its view on IBE. In order to resolve this tension, the
epistemologically motivated deflationist is left with the undesirable choice
either to surrender the attack on nomic knowledge or forfeit their claim to advantage via greater
ontological economy.
One of the purported key advantages of the BSA itself is its greater overall ontological
economy. Proponents claim that we have reason to prefer deflationism over inflationism because it
invokes fewer metaphysical resources to explain the same observable phenomena. Deflationism need
not posit a necessitation relation or other abstract entities over and above the regularities themselves,
and is therefore more parsimonious than inflationism. In appealing to parsimony as a strength, the
deflationist implies that, at least in this case, we have reason to prefer a theory that is more
parsimonious. This implication is an IBE claim; we have reason to prefer the hypothesis that best
explains a given body of evidence (here, the BSA), where “best” is constituted by the most parsimonious
theory for the same informational content. In this manner, appeals to simplicity are by nature a form of
IBE, where the best explanation is the simpler of two equally explanatory theories. Thus, one of the
BSA’s foremost philosophical advantages hinges on the use of IBE. This leads to a significant tension.

14
Deflationists need to uphold IBE in order to defend the BSA’s philosophical advantage with regard to
parsimony, but must deny IBE in the case of inflationist laws to mount the nomic knowledge attack.
Perhaps the deflationist might protest that their own use of IBE is relevantly different from the
inflationist’s, so as to be acceptable. For the inflationist, IBE enters at a specific level– that is, in the
inflationist’s account of scientific knowledge of laws. There is at least one level upon which
deflationists also appeal to IBE: the BSA’s appeal to a simplicity advantage in metaphysical theory
choice. Given its validity on any one level, I argue that the principle should- absent some special reason
to the contrary- hold on the other. The basic notion is that if IBE is truth conducive in science, it is
truth conducive in metaphysical theorizing as well.14 As Laurie Paul argues in her paper “Metaphysics
as modeling: the handmaiden's tale,” this is a symmetric relation. Those desiderata that “lead us to the
truth” generally do so in both domains. There is broad consensus that inference to the best explanation
is a valid tool in the scientific realm, so it should be justified in the metaphysical realm as well. Likewise,
the metaphysician who accepts IBE as truth conducive in philosophy ought to accept it as truth
conducive in science.
Perhaps, the deflationist might produce a principled reason that justifies the use of abduction
on the metaphysical level and not in the domain of science (where inflationism requires it). Paul largely
addresses arguments that make the reverse claim. For example, she explores the argument that science’s
confirmability constitutes a relevant difference such that the validity of IBE holds in science but does
not extend to metaphysics. She rejects this argument on the basis that while “the empirical, confirmable
features of scientific theories have allowed us to confirm the value of theoretical desiderata for
14

Paul (2012), 21.
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theorizing,” this is a difference of mere confirmability and not truth conduciveness. Here, she
concludes that “if such features are truth conducive in the case of science, they should be truth
conducive more generally.”15 Indeed, some deflationists explicitly defend the symmetry between
metaphysical and scientific explanation. For example, in “A Better Best System Account of Lawhood,”
Cohen and Callender argue that “recognizing in science the attempt to produce small sets of basic
principles as a result of balancing simplicity and informativeness is the central and powerful insight
that motivates” the BSA. Here, they suggest that the account itself is motivated by the principle that
IBE in the scientific realm translates to its validity in the metaphysical realm.
I concur with Paul that if one upholds IBE in one domain, there is significant pressure to
uphold it in both domains. However, even if a principled distinction could be found, it would still
likely work in the inflationist’s favor. The deflationist who wishes to argue that IBE is valid in
metaphysics but not science faces the uphill battle of countering the empirical data that supports
abduction’s truth conduciveness in scientific practice. The reverse argument seems simpler to defend
(namely on the basis of that very data). Regardless, I contend that a deflationist argument that accepts
IBE on one of these levels but denies it on other level(s) without a principled reason for doing so is
troublingly inconsistent.
In light of the described tension, the epistemologically motivated deflationist must either
renounce IBE to retain the nomic knowledge attack, but forfeit the basis for one of their foremost
advantages, or uphold IBE and forfeit the nomic knowledge attack. In any case, deflationists simply
can’t have their IBE and eat it too.
15

Ibid, 22.
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Let’s imagine a deflationist opts to do the former: renounce IBE, keep the attack on nomic
knowledge, and surrender their advantage via ontological economy. In this manner, they attempt to
avoid inconsistency, but bite a large bullet: the loss of one of their foremost advantages. I will now
show that they purchase nothing with this large concession because this line of reasoning ultimately
does not avoid implicit use of IBE. Even without the appeal to ontological economy, the deflationist
remains under significant pressure to accept IBE because it underlies the BSA’s internal axiomatization
method. Lewis himself describes the BSA in words that ring of IBE. He explains that the regularities
that “earn inclusion in the best system” are those that “have as much information content as it [they]
can have without sacrificing too much simplicity.”16 As argued earlier, simplicity appeals involve the use
of IBE. Appeals to fewer posits only apply where these posits explain the same body of facts. This
internal simplicity criterion states that the regularities that merit lawhood are those that are simplest for
equally explanatory content. If IBE posits that we have the reason to prefer the explanation that
displays the most explanatory virtues, and we take simplicity and informativeness as explanatory
virtues, internal to the BSA is a form of IBE. The BSA requires this principle to make determinations
about which regularities merit axiomatization as laws.
Furthermore, even if this tension could be avoided, it is unclear that deflationism truly has an
epistemic advantage. On an inflationist account, there is the issue of inferring from observations– i.e.
instances of regularities– to truths about the relations between them, that is, the laws. Uncertainty
arises in this gap between what we can observe and what we infer. In this manner, inflationism

16

Lewis (1983), 367.
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prompts us to worry that we might not infer correctly what the real relations are. Psychological facts
about an epistemic agent might blend into their inferences and make them less than perfectly reliable.
Now compare with the deflationist account of lawhood. The epistemic barriers are perhaps
even more insurmountable. Here, I defer to Kreines’s worry about the impossibility of our finite
inquiry providing the infinite empirical data needed to determine which laws fit into the best system.
He writes:
A best system account might guarantee that one would begin to approximate
knowledge of laws as one approached the limit of inquiry. But perhaps the world is
infinitely complex in the sense that our finite inquiry would never approach the end of
all possible empirical observations, at every level of detail, resulting from all possible
experiments…On the face of it, then, it is a contingent matter whether or not our
inquiry began with intuitive beliefs that have so far sent inquiry only away from the
ideal. So why should it be rational for us to follow guiding or unifying principles that
might– no matter how long of a finite period we devote to empirical inquiry– still be
leading us astray?17
On a deflationist account, laws are merely patterns of events appropriately axiomatized, and we come
to know these patterns by empirical observation. Among the many accidental regularities that occur in
nature across history, those which merit lawhood are those that best cohere into a system of maximal
simplicity and informativeness. Knowledge of laws, then, is a process of systematic axiomatization of
regularities observed across all of history. As Schaffer writes in a footnote, “point of clarification: as I
use the notion, history includes past, present, and future. It is not limited to the past.”18 However, once
we apprehend the vast purview of history, it becomes apparent that deflationism has a different and
perhaps more pervasive epistemic problem. Since we lack information about future events, our ability

17
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Schaffer (2008), 100.
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to judge which regularities across all of history merit lawhood is limited. We lack access to this
potentially infinite portion of what Schaffer deems history, and yet we would need to observe it to
generate the most accurate axiomatization.
Imagine that until now gravity has held, but at some point in the far future, it will reverse. For
the rest of history, stretching infinitely far into the future, empirical observation proves quite different
than what we’ve seen until now. An objective observer axiomatizing the best system based upon the
totality of history would identify a different, and more accurate, pattern than we are equipped to
observe from our limited temporal perspective. Located on a small segment of the infinite graph of
history, we are unable to see the large peaks and valleys that may follow.19 On a deflationist account,
even the most epistemically virtuous agent can only approximate the best system, lacking the infinite
data required to deduce the patterns most accurately.
These considerations raise a large concerns for epistemologically motivated defenses of
deflationism. The major epistemological arguments for the strongest form of deflationism-- the BSA-are constrained by a tension with regard to abduction. The deflationist needs to deny IBE to mount an
attack on knowledge of I-laws, and simultaneously uphold IBE to to maintain a simplicity advantage
and to axiomatize regularities. And even if such a tension could be avoided, there remains the concern
of the indeterminacy of finite inquiry. These worries undermine the tenability of epistemologically
motivated deflationism and call for a different sort of deflationism that doesn’t rest upon staunch
empiricist commitments.

19
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CHAPTER THREE

A CRITIQUE OF NON-EPISTEMOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED
DEFLATIONISM
Having concluded that epistemologically motivated deflationism faces an
internal tension, I will move onto the second sort of deflationism-- what I will
refer to as non-epistemologically motivated deflationism. This approach
attempts to shed the strict empiricist trappings of more traditional deflationist
arguments. In forfeiting the nomic knowledge attack and taking a more
favorable stance toward abduction, the non-epistemologically motivated deflationist is able to maintain
their advantage via simplicity without inconsistency. Many recent deflationist accounts, such as that of
Schaffer, take this route. Schaffer, who describes his position as “broadly inspired by Hume and
Lewis,” rejects the attack on nomic knowledge. He writes that the epistemological reasoning that
undergirds it is “disastrously skeptical,” requiring an empiricism so strict it will “force one to
solipsism.” He leaves open the possibility of knowledge via abduction, conceding that perhaps “we can
find indirect theoretical warrant” for unobservable phenomena such as laws. That is, via IBE, it is
compatible with an inflationist account that laws are knowable to science.20 Indeed, by his lights, “it
remains perfectly appropriate..for the inflationist to argue that we can directly observe certain
sequences of events that provide evidence for theoretical claims about the laws.”21 In place of appealing

20
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to an empirical epistemological limit, Schaffer pivots toward methodological arguments that he claims
skirt the inconsistencies at work in the nomic knowledge attack and its skeptical consequences.
Schaffer attacks inflationism on two counts: theoretical fathomability and ontological
economy. Given that deflationism better meets these methodological desiderata, he argues that “laws
reduce to history”-- that is to deflationist regularities-- “unless sufficiently countervailing
considerations can be adduced.”22 If these arguments for deflationism do not depend on the sort of
epistemological limit that denies IBE, he avoids the tension I identify in the deflationist position.
However, I will argue that Schaffer’s appeal to theoretical fathomability may also depend upon an
epistemological limit, and therefore fails to resolve the tension I describe.
Schaffer argues that the inflationist presents “a completely unfathomable theory.”23 I can
identify two possible ways to interpret this argument. One interpretation would be that Schaffer thinks
its lesser fathomability is simply apparent. On this reading, his claim borders on begging the question:
“the argument from theoretical fathomability proceeds by pointing out that necessary connections
have an air of the occult, implying inexplicable necessary connections between distinct existents.”24 It is
the task of the deflationist to argue precisely that there are not necessary connections between distinct
existents. An argument against this theory ought to do more than merely point to the theory itself and
scoff. To use Lewis’s own words, “I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare.”25
However, one substantive version of Schaffer’s argument via fathomability would require the
very empiricist assumptions that he disputed. Schaffer assumes that unfathomability is a detriment to
22
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an account of laws. Inflationist laws are unfathomable because they posit abstract “connections,”
which “have an air of the occult.” Why do necessary connections have an air of the occult? Presumably,
it is because they are abstract, invisible, unobserved. He seems to suggest that the BSA is more
fathomable because we have greater, or more direct, epistemological access to regularities. He hints at
this interpretation, writing that the reason “irreducible laws seem far less fathomable” than other
ontological entities “may be due to the more theoretical, less observable nature of lawhood.”26 Here,
Schaffer suggests that an account that is not based in something observable-- in empirical sense data--is
less fathomable. The implicit premise here is that we are unable, or more modestly, less able to fathom
that which has no basis in empirical sense data.
To motivate this distinction, Schaffer might require some form of content empiricism. Here, I
follow Winkler in distinguishing between content empiricism and justification empiricism, the former
“concerning the content of thought” and the latter “concerning the justification of belief.” Content
empiricism entails that “experience is the ultimate source of all of our conceptions.”27 This reasoning is
at work in Schaffer’s implication that we cannot fathom, or are less able to fathom, that which is not
rooted in experience. In contrast, the epistemological reasoning Schaffer condemns as “disastrous”
earlier in the paper is an example of justification empiricism. Justification empiricism states that
“experience is the only source of evidence for our beliefs.” Schaffer renounces the nomic knowledge
argument for its strict application of this principle– its assertion that the only evidence we are justified
in believing is that which is based in sensory experience. Since the sort of empiricism he condemns is

26
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justificatory and the one he requires is related to content, Schaffer might believe that the latter does not
entail the same “disastrous” effects. However, I will now argue that Schaffer’s attack on fathomability,
interpreted in this manner, has unattractive consequences for the deflationist.
The content empiricist denies that we can fathom any entity that is not accessible via sensory
experience. I-laws are not accessible via sensory experience. Thus given content empiricism, I-laws are
unfathomable. Schaffer raises worries that the justification empiricism underlying the nomic
knowledge argument “will force one to solipsism.”28 It entails that beliefs not based in sensory
experience are unjustified. On the most extreme interpretation, since we only directly experience
impressions in our own minds, it would follow that we are only justified in believing in the existence of
our mind.
However, by parallel reasoning, content empiricism engenders similar concerns to those he
identifies. It entails that concepts not based in sensory experience are unfathomable. Since we only
directly experience impressions in our own mind, it would follow that we can only fathom that which
exists in our own mind. Schaffer himself writes that “once we countenance an external reality (and who
would reject that?) we are already dabbling in entities we cannot directly access.”29 Surely, most
deflationists would not want to suggest that we cannot fathom anything that exists beyond one’s own
mind. Thus, though he claims to avoid the “disastrously skeptical” reasoning he sees in the nomic
knowledge argument, Schaffer would need to employ similar reasoning if his claim of inflationism’s
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unfathomability proceeds from content empiricism. And yet, without content empiricism, I fail to see
how he can motivate his fathomability attack on inflationism beyond an “incredulous stare.”
Moreover, content empiricism undermines Schaffer’s own account of deflationism. Schaffer
defines reduction as “an ontological relation, expressing dependence between entities.”30 So, he
requires at least one entity not derived from sensory experience to defend the BSA– that is some sort of
dependence relation. Under the BSA, laws reduce to events; there is a relation of dependence between
laws and events. This type of relation cannot be observed through sensory experience. Given content
empiricism, therefore, reduction itself is an unfathomable concept. So without content empiricism,
Schaffer’s argument via fathomability amounts to what Lewis himself called “an incredulous stare.”
And yet, given content empiricism, the argument has unattractive skeptical implications and
contradicts Schaffer’s appeal to reduction as a dependence relation.
For Schaffer, a further strike against the fathomability of inflationist laws is that the intuitions
involved are “remnants of a dubious theology.”31 He explains:
...the notion of lawhood in use is a direct descendant of the theological views of
Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, who viewed laws as divine decrees concerning the
clockwork of the world...But if one rejects the view of laws as divine decrees, it is not
clear why one should continue to hold onto the intuitions it engenders.32
This sort of worry seems to me largely a form of irrelevant guilt by association. It would be difficult to
prove that inflationist intuitions directly resulted from a theological worldview, and in any case, that
30
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seems no reason to reject them outright. However, if Schaffer wishes to mount this type of attack, it
would equally invalidate his own use of ontological economy. In addition to theoretical fathomability,
Schaffer’s key remaining non-epistemological argument for deflationism is based upon ontological
economy. However, Schaffer’s appeal to deflationism’s ontological economy is at odds with his
condemnation of inflationary intuitions as “vestiges of a theological worldview,” as ontological
economy is itself tied to the theological views he finds suspect on the inflationist side.33
In fact, Ockham himself-- originator of the famed razor- was a Franciscan friar, who also wrote
extensively about Catholic theology. He built God into the principle itself, arguing that “no plurality
should be assumed unless it can be proved (a) by reason, or (b) by experience, or (c) by some infallible
authority.”34 In c, he notably allows for a “religious exclusion” admitting “the Bible, the Saints, and
certain pronouncements of the Church” into his reasoning.35 The origins of ontological economy as a
principle are deeply entangled with theism, and some argue “largely an inheritance of 17th-century
theology.”36 Key formulations of such a principle were offered by Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz37,
who tethered the notion to God’s perfection.38 Indeed, many of Lewis’s own philosophical
commitments are “in this sense a direct descendent of Leibniz's methodology.” 39 As stated above, I do
not intend to imply that ontological economy’s historical connection to Christian theology invalidates
33
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it as a principle. However, I do contend that if Schaffer wishes to attack inflationists on this score, he
also undermines his own position, which is guilty of the same charge.
Theist associations aside, Schaffer writes that inflationary accounts “attempt to convince us
that more things exist than we may fathom or need.”40 In this manner, he argues that inflationism is less
parsimonious than deflationism, failing Ockham’s Razor constraints by multiplying entities beyond
necessity. I will now argue that deflationism may not be more parsimonious than inflationism, and that
even if a marginal advantage could be proven, it would be offset by the advantages in explanatory
power that inflationism offers. The deflationist is hanging on by the thin and fraying rope of
ontological economy, which may snap under the weight of explanatory power.
Firstly, I wish to note that deflationism may need to appeal to more metaphysical resources
than initially supposed.15 A deflationist might have argued that their account is more economic because
it need not posit abstract entities, while inflationism does. However, in “New Work For a Theory of
Universals,” Lewis identifies an area where the BSA does require abstract entities- namely a distinction
between natural and non-natural properties. Regularities are only laws if they contribute to the
collective simplicity and strength of the system as a whole. But, according to Lewis, “different ways to
express the same content, using different vocabulary, will differ in simplicity.”41 Here, he is referring to
elegance or syntactic simplicity, rather than ontological economy. Lewis worries that the elegance of a
given proposition is relative to the particular language used to express it. If so, under the BSA, the
status of a law might change depending on the language it’s expressed in. This seems like a detriment to
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deflationism as a universal metaphysical theory. It shouldn’t matter whether you’re talking about
gravity, la gravité, or 重力; a law is a law regardless of language. To account for this and standardize
elegance across languages, Lewis argues that the laws should “refer only to perfectly natural
properties.”42 He writes:
Formerly I had been persuaded by Goodman and others that all properties were equal:
it was hopeless to try to distinguish “natural” properties from gruesomely
gerrymandered, disjunctive properties. Eventually I was persuaded, largely by D. M.
Armstrong, that the distinction I had rejected was so commonsensical and so
serviceable—indeed, was so often indispensable—that it was foolish to try to get on
without it.43
These properties, perhaps such as charge or mass, are essentially distinct from non-natural, arbitrary
properties such as Goodman’s famous “grue”-- being observed as green before a fixed time t. The
distinction is abstract, and Lewis takes it to be primitive,44 irreducible to any concrete, particular
entities. Thus, deflationism needs to posit at least one abstract metaphysical resource in addition to the
regularities themselves-- namely certain “natural properties to explain determinacy of interpretation.”45
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Therefore, even if deflationism remains overall more economic than inflationism, the margin isn’t so
wide as it may ostensibly appear.
Furthermore, recall that Schaffer defines reduction as “an ontological relation, expressing
dependence between entities,” and offers grounding as a theory of this relation.46 Formulated thus, a
tally of the entities posited by each account reveals a surprising symmetry. Both accounts require
individual events, grouped generally into patterns or regularities. The inflationist account of laws
requires an additional entity- namely some sort of abstract relation that gives laws their governing
function. In this manner, inflationism offers one way to complete Dretske’s formula “law=universal
truth+ X,” where X is this relation. However, the deflationist account can be formulated much in
similar terms. D-laws, on Schaffer’s formulation of the BSA, are universal regularities imbued with a
dependence relation. In this manner, the best systems theory is likewise an iteration of the formula
Dretske labels “law = universal truth+X,” the X being “a relation of dependence,” namely reduction.
Therefore, Schaffer’s version of the BSA may posit no fewer entities than inflationism. If so, given
reduction as a form of dependence, Schaffer forfeits his claim to deflationism’s greater ontological
economy. Moreover, once deflationism adduces this sort of abstract relation, it becomes less clear what
its advantages over full blown inflationism would be. Thus, it seems, at least given this version of
deflationism, we ought to put Ockham’s Razor back in its sheath.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EXPLANATION

Most agree that we expect laws, be they d-laws or I-laws, to
serve some explanatory function. Loewer acknowledges that
“it is generally believed that laws play a central role in
explanations” and “if this is so, then..it counts against the
reduction [of laws to events]” if they do not explain their
instances.47 I will now argue that deflationist laws cannot explain their instances, and that the most
promising attempt to address this concern requires an unprincipled distinction between scientific and
metaphysical explanation.
But first, drawing upon a modified version of a thought experiment offered by Dretske, I will
attempt to illustrate the intuitiveness of the inflationist model of explanation. Instead of a coin toss, I
will explore a lottery, which I believe better captures the miniscule probabilities involved. Imagine you
regularly buy lottery tickets. Each month a new winner is announced with a 5 digit number,
purportedly selected via a random generator. The chance of your number being drawn should be
around 1 in 302,575,350.8 After many months, you see a consistent pattern. The same combination of
numbers wins over and over again. What would you conclude about the lottery? Or, more specifically,
what inferences could be rationally made to explain this regularity? I imagine most would suspect some
sort of foul play or error. If the supposedly random generator consistently selects the same
combination of numbers, one might infer that the generator isn’t really random at all. Most people
47
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would be suspicious that there’s some reason explaining why this regularity has emerged. It seems to be
a better explanation of the observed phenomenon to suppose that the generator has been somehow
manipulated than to assume that it has truly randomly selected the same combination multiple times–
which has a fraction of a 1 in 302,575,350 chance of occurring.
Now, take the case of laws. The chance of matter in freefall accelerating at exactly 9.8m/s2 in
every single observable case by mere chance-- without the law of gravity as a governing principle-- is
infinitely lower than the chance of a random generator churning out the same five digit number
multiple times in a row. IBE seems intuitively to dictate that the regularity is not random, that the
existence of some governing or regulatory force such as an I-law better explains the observable data
than random chance. This sort of intuition from observable regularity to inferred cause is ubiquitous
in human inquiry, from everyday questions to scientific experimentation. This intuition is among the
core motivations for inflationism. Nevertheless, this example only serves to illustrate a commonly held
intuition. I will now argue that the core basis of deflationism’s insufficiency is its circular explanation
structure.
To most clearly observe the explanatory insufficiency of deflationism, I distinguish between
three propositions:
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1.

All Fs are Gs.

2.

Fness —> Gness.

3.

This F is a G, that F is a G etc. (each individual F is a G)
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Here the arrow signifies a dependence relation, meaning “Fness depends on Gness.” For now, I mean to refer to
dependence broadly, not specifying whether the relation in question is one of necessitation (as Armstrong and others might
hypothesize).
I am using Armstong’s general construction for illustration. In a longer version of this paper, I would show why I believe
the same applies to Bird’s slightly different inflationist model based on inherent powers in natural kinds.
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Inflationists and deflationists alike generally agree that proposition 3 explains proposition 1. This has
great intuitive force. Imagine you randomly draw ten marbles out of a jar, and all ten turn out to be
red. If asked to explain why all the marbles are red, it would be reasonable to reply that since each
individual marble drawn was red, all the marbles drawn are. Setting aside the issue of whether there is a
further causal explanation, most would agree that the fact that the individual marbles are red in some
sense explains why they all are. Here, proposition 3– each individual marble drawn is red– accounts for
proposition 1– all marbles drawn are red.
However, most deflationists also posit that proposition 1 explains 3.49 “All Fs are Gs” is an
example of a regularity. If d-laws are regularities, proposition 1 has the form of a d-law. If d-laws
explain their instances, deflationism requires that 1 explains 3 (the instances of the regularity stated in
1). For example, if asked to explain why each individual marble drawn is red, the deflationist would
explain it in terms of a regularity— because all marbles drawn are red.
Here arises a key problem for the deflationist. If proposition 1 explains proposition 3, and yet 3
also explains 1, deflationism depends on a circular form of explanation, wherein the explanandum and
explanans are constituted by the same facts. Fred Dretske, Tim Maudlin, and others present arguments
to this effect. Maudlin writes that D-laws cannot explain their instances because “if the laws are
nothing but generic features of the Humean Mosaic, then there is a sense in which one cannot appeal
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to those very laws to explain the particular features of the Mosaic itself.”50 If the laws are nothing more
than the instances taken together, the laws cannot explain the instances without in some sense invoking
a form of self-explanation- wherein the instances help to explain themselves. Dretske doesn’t mince
words on the subject, writing that on a deflationist account, “the explanatory attempt is never even
made.” Here, he implies that self-explanation is not an explanation at all. If d-laws can only explain
their instances by self-explanation, they fail to explain in the requisite sense.
Inflationists, on the contrary, avoid this bind. On an inflationist account, proposition 3 does
explain proposition 1, as is the broad consensus. The generalization regarding the marbles drawn holds
in virtue of the facts about the individual marbles drawn. However, I-laws are not mere regularities,
but rather a relation of the form in proposition 2: Fness —-> Gness.51 It is proposition 2 that explains
proposition 3. Therefore, I-laws explain their instances without circularity. Inflationism can
simultaneously hold that instances account for regularities and that laws explain their instances because
on an inflationist account, mere regularities are not laws.
Here, I-laws fulfill Kim’s proposal that one important criterion of explanation is to “track
dependence relations.”52 This tracking is necessary to capture the directionality that we intuitively
expect of explanations, and that underlie suspicions regarding deflationary explanation. It is what, in
Kim’s terms, distinguishes “knowing why” from “knowing that” and provides “the mark of a
theoretical science,” which “ go[es] beyond "phenomenological descriptions" of observed regularities to
provide an “understanding of why the fact obtains.”53 Kreines (2017) calls this the simple intuition:
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“an explanation must provide information about an underlying condition on which an explanandum
really depends.” This dependence relation is what explanation captures, and what answers the “why”
question Kim identifies, as opposed to merely the “that.” Kreines continues:
Consider the idea that a natural law is a regularity or a generalization stating a
regularity. Can we explain why B’s regularly follow A’s by appeal to the regularity
that B’s always follow A’s? Not if the simple intuition is correct.
D-laws fail to explain because they do not reflect the genuine dependence relation involved. I-laws
explain because they capture these relations. Furthermore, by capturing the appropriate directionality
of these relations, they avoid circuitous self-explanation.
A deflationist could perhaps deny that laws need explain their instances at all. However, like
Loewer, Miller, and others, I find this unsatisfying; “the problem, though, is that we do expect laws to
help explain their instances.”54 Some deflationists argue that this expectation is founded in faulty,
generally theistic, intuitions. I will not take up that issue here except to refer back to my argument that
Schaffer’s condemnation of theological intuitions equally works against his own use of ontological
economy.55
Loewer responds to the issue of self-explanation by distinguishing between metaphysical and
scientific explanation, arguing that inflationist intuitions wrongfully conflate the two. Loewer
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contends that “it is apparent that they are different enterprises.”56 In his terms, while metaphysical
explanation “is one in which a type of fact…is shown to be grounded in or constituted by some other
kind of fact,” scientific explanation “typically shows why the event occurred in terms of prior events
and laws.”57
When inflationists accuse d-laws of self-explanation, Loewer claims, they confuse these two
different answers to the question “why,” mistakenly expecting a parallelism between metaphysical
explanations and scientific ones. Metaphysical explanation is of the form of proposition 3 explaining 1.
D-laws are metaphysically explained by the facts about their instances. D-laws nevertheless scientifically
explain their instances. That is, scientifically, proposition 1 explains proposition 3. Given that these
two types of explanation are different, there is no circularity in these two statements and no
troublesome implication of self-explanation.58
However, this view seems no more promising. One of the primary motivations of deflationism
is its claimed accordance with scientific views of reality. Cohen and Callender succinctly summarize
one of the appeals of BSA as follows: “The modesty of … [its] extra-scientific apparatus has made the
view seem attractive to thinkers who are inclined to defer to the best scientific descriptions of the
world.” On Loewer’s view, deflationism has the unattractive consequence of requiring an
extra-scientific notion of explanation that applies only to metaphysical explanandum. It is unclear why
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metaphysical explanations should differ from scientific ones, aside from the mere desire to maintain a
deflationist view of laws. As argued in part 1 with regard to Paul’s account of IBE, barring some special
reason to the contrary, methodological principles in science ought to hold in metaphysics.
“Metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology,” and thus if our
explanations are considered satisfactory in one realm, they should do so in both.59 If laws explain their
instances in science, I fail to see why the explanatory goal post should shift in the case of metaphysics
without a principled distinction. If we hold, as Schaffer and Loewer cede, that scientific explanation
requires a notion of directional dependence, we ought conclude that metaphysical explanation does
too.
Both deflationists and inflationists largely agree that laws should explain their instances in
science. Since D-laws are regularities, if d-laws are the laws, then regularities should explain their
instances in science. If regularities explain their instances in science, then they should explain their
instances in metaphysics as well unless some principled distinction can be drawn. However, as argued
above, regularities cannot explain their instances in metaphysics without circularity. So, regularities do
not explain their instances in science. Therefore, d-laws, which are regularities, do not explain their
instances in science either. If this is the case, deflationism has the unintuitive consequence of rendering
instances of regularities inexplicable by laws.
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CHAPTER FIVE
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THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

If one motivation for belief in I-Laws is that they better explain
regularities than d-laws, a question arises: why stop the explanatory
quest at the laws? By the very logic employed in requiring an
explanation beyond the regularities, are you not compelled to explain
the existence of the laws themselves? If so, this is troubling. It may seem
that the inflationist, in demanding an explanation beyond mere regularities, has opened the floodgates
to an infinite regress. It seems arbitrary to stop at the laws. If we are compelled to explain the
regularities, why are we not equally compelled to explain the laws themselves?
This worry can be teased apart into two related concerns:
1. An explanation isn’t truly explanatory unless it is complete.
2. Inflationism commits us to the full-blown Principle of Sufficient Reason.
I’ll begin with number one, which I see as the least worrying. Inflationism may explain the
regularities, complains the deflationist, but it stops short of explaining the existence of the laws. It
merely passes the explanatory buck back one step, so to speak. Since it leaves this and many other
questions unanswered, one might argue that it does no better than deflationism, which simply stops
one step earlier, at the observable regularities. To this first concern, I’d respond that explanatoriness can
come in degrees. Explanation does not fail completely just because it is incomplete. Imagine that while
60
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I was typing this paragraph, my window shattered (thankfully leaving my laptop unharmed). I would
naturally want an explanation. I notice a baseball on the ground, and conclude that it was the baseball
that caused the shattering. Then, I later learn that my brother threw the baseball that hit the window,
resulting in the shattering. Knowing that my brother had thrown it provides additional explanatory
depth. However, the explanatory chain could go even further. Suppose I find out that my brother
threw the baseball because he was angry. Why was he angry? A friend had been rude to him at school.
Why was the friend rude? He had just had a difficult conversation with his father. Why was the
conversation difficult? His father is deeply emotionally unavailable. Why is his father emotionally
unavailable? He had had a difficult childhood. And so on…
The explanatory regress seems to go back infinitely. And yet, it would seem unreasonable to say
that in order to explain why my window shattered today, I would need to appeal to my brother’s
friend’s father’s childhood struggles. The first explanation: “my brother threw a baseball into the
window”-- is not insufficient because it fails to include these other portions of the causal chain, which
stretch back perhaps to the big bang (or further still). And yet, the answer that my brother threw the
baseball is a better explanation than merely stating that “a baseball hit my window.” It provides a
greater level of explanatory depth, even though it perhaps does not provide the maximal explanatory
depth possible. Explanation exists on a long, if not infinite, chain of dependence relations. What it is to
explain is to map out the chain of these relations, insofar as they are relevant to the explanandum. Our
inability to track the entire chain of explicability shouldn’t negate the fact that positing some steps
along the chain might be more explanatory than surrendering from the start. Inflationism, in positing
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laws to explain regularities, may not succeed in explaining all that there is, but nevertheless may
provide greater explanatory depth than deflationism.
Underlying this critique, however, is a looming concern. Does inflationism commit us to the
Principle of Sufficient Reason? The PSR states that for any “thing (object, state of affairs, or whatever)
that exists or obtains, there is an explanation of its existence, there is a reason that it exists.”61 If we
assume there must be an explanation for the regularities, why not assume there must be an explanation
for the laws? Beebee raises this concern, calling it “inductive vertigo.” 62 Even Armstrong cedes that
this is a potential worry for the inflationist:
To appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason is to insist that there must be an
explanation why things are so rather than another way. The appeal must therefore
enlist the sympathy of anyone who, like myself, looks to an account of laws which
treats them as explanations of regularities. Should we not go further and explain the
laws themselves?63
I take this concern seriously– seriously enough that I will not attempt to counter it directly. Here, I will
merely sketch a way that the deflationist faces exactly the same problem. Therefore, if this is correct, it
is no particular argument against inflationism.
Firstly, it will help to identify what precisely it is about inflationism that seems to suggest the
PSR. Why should the suggestion that these patterns in natural phenomena require explanation entail
that all things require an explanation? It seems that what may link inflationism to the PSR is its
implementation of IBE paired with a principle regarding theoretical consistency. By the latter, I mean
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something such as Della Rocca’s suggestion that we “ought feel bad about rejecting” arguments that
are structurally identical to others we accept barring a “principled difference.”64
If it is reasonable to infer from observed phenomena to an underlying explanation, one
assumes that for this given observation there must be an explanation. If one makes this assumption in
one case, they may be obligated to make the assumption in all cases, barring a principled distinction.
So IBE provides support for the full-blown PSR (though I wouldn’t argue that it necessarily commits
one to it). The deflationist who wishes to cast aspersions on inflationism by linking it to the PSR does
so with IBE as a bridge. To draw the explanatory line where the inflationist does, they have some
obligation to provide a principled difference that makes it reasonable to posit unexplained (or perhaps
even unexplainable) laws, but not unexplained regularities.
I have previously argued that Ockham’s Razor is a form of inference to the best explanation,
dictating belief in the explanation that minimizes posits for the same explanatory scope. As developed
in previous chapters, ontological economy is among the primary purported virtues of deflationism.
Given the close relationship between IBE and Ockham’s Razor, I contend that Ockham’s Razor shares
a close connection with the PSR. Thus, if one supposes that IBE implies the PSR, the deflationist who
employs Ockham’s Razor–itself a form of IBE– is likewise tethered to the PSR. Of course, there
remains the choice to argue that IBE does not imply a commitment to the PSR, but to do so is to
equally exculpate the inflationist’s employment as well.
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Ockham’s Razor entreats us not to multiply entities beyond necessity when seeking an
explanation of some phenomena. The inverse implied is that when seeking an explanation, we ought
multiply entities only when necessary. For instance, if you wanted to explain how this thesis came to be,
you might posit that there exists (or existed, yikes) a student that wrote it. You infer an explanation of
this document’s existence from the information provided to you. Most would agree that it would be
very unreasonable for you to posit the existence of magical fairies that aided me in writing my thesis.
Why? Because the thesis was already explained by positing a student and so, you had no reason to posit
these fairies. To do so would be to posit the existence of more entities than are needed to explain the
phenomenon in question (i.e. this thesis). Here, the PSR once again rears its head. If one accepts
Ockham’s Razor, one accepts an explicability argument; one ought not multiply entities when there is
no sufficient reason to do so. Given a principle about theoretical consistency, accepting Ockham’s
Razor seems to provide at least some pressure to accept the PSR more generally. Willard pursues this
line in her paper “Against Simplicity” with great lucidity:
Why should we hold that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity? To put it
plainly, to add more entities than necessary would be to add entities without a sufficient
reason for doing so...A commitment to ontological parsimony sneaks in a commitment
to the principle of sufficient reason.
Perhaps one can find a way to stop short of accepting the PSR while maintaining Ockham’s Razor.
Willard is doubtful: “it is not at all clear that the proponent of grounding would be able to draw a
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principled line between the entities that need to be explained and the entities that do not.” 65 But if
they can in the case of Ockham’s Razor, they should be able to draw a similar line for IBE, thus
blocking the explanatory regress attack on inflationism as well.
Now, one might worry that my treatment here has entangled epistemic and metaphysical
concerns too much, the PSR being a primarily metaphysical principle and Ockham’s razor being
epistemic.66 I am agnostic on the question, though I do believe there is a strong link between IBE, the
PSR, and Ockham’s Razor that potentially blurs epistemic and metaphysical lines. However, in case
this objection worries you, I will raise another, more clearly metaphysical, way in which deflationists
might rely on the PSR.
Though they do not require an explanation of the regularities themselves, deflationists still
invoke the assumption that there ought be an explanation of which regularities merit lawhood and
which do not. Why couldn’t the regularity that “all people reading this thesis are interested in
philosophy” merit lawhood in the best system? Lewis’s answer is that it fails to contribute to the
collective simplicity and strength of the system as a whole. Does this not amount to the response that
there must be sufficient reason for its inclusion in the system? Deflationists require there to be a reason
for a regularity’s inclusion in the best system. If they hold this principle on this level, it seems they are
under similar pressure to embrace the full-blown PSR, unless they can draw a principled line to justify
ending explanation here. By this path, they again arrive at a similar dilemma to the inflationist.
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Armstrong seems to agree that both views share this problem, and furthermore it is a problem for
“every philosophy”:
..If explanation has to stop short of the Absolute, then we have to accept brute fact,
that is, contingency, at some point. At what point should we do this? That is a
question of the utmost delicacy for every philosophy. In my judgment, the regularity
theory of laws gives up much too soon.
It’s a herculean task to determine where the line should be. I can see the appeal of drawing the
explanatory line at the empirical; we should not posit entities beyond the observable. However, as
explored earlier, the deflationist does not draw the line here. The BSA posits abstract distinctions
between non-natural and natural properties to account for the indeterminacy of language. So even the
deflationist cannot draw a line neatly at the empirical. 67
Put simply, the issue of the Principle of Sufficient Reason plagues both inflationists and
deflationists. Thus, while I won’t attempt to rebuff the deflationist’s concerns, I simply reply that for
those frightened off by the PSR, it seems deflationism is no escape.
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I’ll propose just one possible way of drawing the line: everything that we can observe demands an explanation. On this
view, since we can observe the regularities, we must explain them. I-laws, as I've argued, do so more effectively than d-laws
because they avoid circularity. However, since we can’t directly observe the laws themselves, they do not demand an
explanation. Here, we could have a principled way of justifying inflationism. It explains the observable, but no explanation
is required beyond this point.
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CHAPTER SIX
PREDICTION AND CHANCE
I take it that one of the goals of scientific inquiry, in addition to
discovering basic laws, is to predict future events. When a physicist
uncovers the behavior of subatomic particles, they often do so in the hopes
of predicting physical processes. A meteorologist studies the weather in
order to predict future weather events. A cardiologist might study the function of the heart in the
hopes of finding ways to predict impending heart attacks. Climate scientists study past data in order to
predict and prevent climate disaster. As developed in the previous chapter, most agree that scientific
laws should explain their instances. Scientific laws are also, for the most part, taken to be predictive– to
hold reliably such that their instantiation is predictable.68
There is a basic symmetry between explanation and prediction in this case, wherein the
dependence links that comprise the explanation provide the basis for prediction. Kim explains the
symmetry thus:
Suppose that the event to be explained is to occur at time t. Then, to say that a given
explanation of the event has predictive power is to say that if the initial conditions of
the explanation are ascertained before t and the laws used in the explanation are also
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There are however exceptions. In “Inference, Explanation, and Prediction,” Kim highlights how some explanations lack
predictive power, thus severing this symmetry: “Philosophers have noted the existence of explanations that lack "predictive
power," such as explanations of the occurrence of earthquakes and evolutionary explanations of the emergence of a new
biological species. It is hardly possible, at the present state of scientific knowledge, to predict these events with any
significant reliability” (366). It is often not possible to ascertain the initial conditions preceding an event before the event
occurs, and therefore, one may be able to devise a perfectly good retrospective explanation without having been able to
predict the event itself. It seems however, that this schism can only go in one direction. That which explains may not
predict. But that which predicts must also explain. Though beyond the scope of this project, there is much to be said on the
topic of explanation as a possible prerequisite for prediction.

43
known before t, then an argument-token which is of the same type as the explanation
could have functioned as a predictive argument to predict the occurrence of the event.
In this manner, the content and structure of a prediction mirrors its corresponding explanation. They
both involve certain initial conditions plus laws that dictate or otherwise affect final conditions. So if
deflationism fails to capture the appropriate directionality of dependence relations required for
explanation, it is not surprising that it likewise fails in terms of prediction. Thus, given the exploration
of explanation developed in the previous chapter, we have good reason to suspect that deflationism will
suffer in terms of the predictive power of laws as well. If laws fail to explain, we have good reason to
think they will fail to predict.
In this chapter I will argue that d-laws are fundamentally deficient, or at the very least
extremely revisionary, in terms of our typical understandings of prediction. In contrast, inflationism
offers a model of scientific laws in which prediction as we ordinarily understand it is possible. This is a
great advantage for inflationism given its implications in the scientific realm. A theory of laws that
cannot account for their predictive role– arguably their primary purpose in scientific inquiry and
application– is in my view, a very unattractive one.
Prediction depends on the rationality of inductive reasoning. If we have no basis to infer facts
about the future from facts about the present, we have no basis to predict. Armstrong (1983) makes
this argument, highlighting the connection between explanation and prediction. Bhogal (2021)
summarizes the bones of the argument in a few succinct premises:
[1] If we think that there is no explanation of an observed pattern then we shouldn’t
believe that this pattern will continue to further, unobserved, cases.
[2] For the Humean there is no explanation of the observed regularities.
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So, [3] The Humean shouldn’t think that the observed regularities will continue to
further cases. 69
We can understand Armstong’s critique of Humeanism about laws by deferring to Hume
himself. Hume’s fork famously carves truth into two categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact.
All truths are either a relation of ideas or a matter of fact. Relations of ideas are a priori deducible. For
example, there are no square circles. Matters of fact are only knowable through empirical observation.
Hume argues that we cannot have knowledge of unobserved matters of fact, including future matters
of fact. Armstrong suggests that on an inflationist account of lawhood, laws are more like relations of
ideas. There's a necessary connection linking one isolated spatio-temporal slice of reality to another in
such a way as to constrain their behavior. By Hume’s own reasoning, it is possible on an inflationist
account to predict truths about unobserved matters of fact by a priori reasoning about these relations
paired with the initial conditions.
However, on a deflationist account of lawhood, laws are mere matters of fact. There is no
governing relation between isolated points in space-time, but merely a pattern of what has happened in
the past. What is a law is settled not by a governing relation, but by history. As such, on Hume’s
account, d-laws cannot tell us anything about unobserved matters of fact. One might invoke a
uniformity principle to the effect that the patterns of the past will hold into the future. However,
Hume himself showed that this is circular. Why should we believe past patterns will hold in the future?
Presumably, the only justification is that they have done so in the past. This justification itself assumes
the uniformity principle. Thus, no such principle can save predictions about unobserved matters of
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fact. And so, Hume’s own fork, in its cold, steely logic, rules out scientific prediction on a Humean
account of laws. Chew on that, deflationists, says Armstrong.
Admittedly, this concern is chiefly addressed to the most extreme, and perhaps least plausible,
version of deflationism. The contemporary deflationist is generally less staunchly empiricist (though
perhaps less honest than Hume himself was about the radically revisionary implications of his work).
And yet, in my reading, I’ve yet to find a real knock-down deflationist response to even this bare-bones
version of Armstrong’s worries about inductive skepticism. Beebee’s response, as Bhogal notes, is
uncharacteristic and unsatisfying. She writes that “we take ourselves to know (fallibly, of course) that
the universe is, in fact, an incredibly ordered place.”70 This belief is what “allows the Humean to
continue to infer from the past to the future.”71 What “know” could mean here leaves me puzzled. For
someone whose work seems otherwise motivated by empirical precision, it’s surprising she chooses to
take on prediction almost as a matter of faith. Is this an opening for a Kierkegaardian deflationism that
recognizes the lack of rational basis for induction, and yet encourages us to take a leap? I can’t imagine
Beebee would have intended this, but it seems to me a viable position worth developing elsewhere. I am
mystified how else to interpret this “knowledge.”
One of the great strengths of Armstrong’s critique is the way it turns Humeanism’s own
reasoning back against itself. A potential weakness is its blindness to the glint of the fork that reflects
back on his own view. It seems that inductive skepticism is a problem for even the inflationist. As
Bhogal asks, “But aren’t there still concerns for the anti-humean here?” (12). This seems right. For
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instance, how can the inflationist be certain that the laws won’t change? Or furthermore, it is possible
the laws are sufficiently complex as to make us incapable of grasping their precise nature:
If we are worried that the laws will change in the future then perhaps we can’t be
confident that the next F we see will be a G. And how does the anti-Humean know
that the laws are not extremely complicated? If the laws can be so complicated then
maybe don’t have reason to think that all observed Fs are Gs is explained by a law that
all Fs are Gs. Perhaps it is explained by some much more complicated law and this more
complicated law implies that at some point in the future Fs will no longer be Gs.
(14-15)72
So, I concede that both sides of the debate have much to worry about when it comes to inductive
skepticism.73 No matter how far we run, it seems we can’t hide from Hume. Nevertheless, being precise
about the implications for scientific prediction in each account may help us outpace him. I will now
argue that the two accounts have different implications when it comes to chance, which forms the basis
of prediction. Deflationist accounts leave science with a large bullet to bite on this score.
Prediction generally involves assessing chances. In a talk at Rutgers in 2019, Ned Hall argues
that deflationism has significant revisionist implications in terms of the way that scientists understand
chance.74 He begins the talk rather lightly with the invocation that Humeans “stop trying to be
something they’re not.” Though his tone is slightly facetious, the sentiment rings true. The challenge
to the deflationist– or as he called them, “honest humeans”-- is to own up to the revisionary
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This worry seems to point to the merits of a view such as Kant’s restrictive inflationism, developed in Kreines (2017). On
this view, laws do govern, but our best inferences will only ever produce approximations of their true nature due to these
inherent epistemic barriers.
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Bhogal (2021) continues to argue that deflationism faces a greater internal problem with induction:
“skepticism about important inductive inferences naturally flows from their position in a way that it doesn't for those who
accept necessary connections.” There is much to be said on this score, though I’m not sure I found his line of reasoning
ultimately convincing. His argument takes on board the suggestion that larger, more global regularities can explain smaller
regularities subsumed within them. I fundamentally disagree that this is a form of explanation in the requisite sense, and so
disagree that his appeal to “the most general regularities in the world” is particularly useful or needed.
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He later was kind enough to explain some of the key points to me over hot chocolate in Cambridge. Any
misrepresentation of his view is likely due to hot-chocolate induced distraction.
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implications of their account, and perhaps to justify the cost to common sense notions of scientific
practice.
In the talk, Hall explored a series of thought experiments intended to bring out the striking
implications of deflationist accounts regarding chance. I have devised a different example in this general
vein that I believe makes the counterintuitive consequences of the deflationist account especially
apparent. I share Hall’s view that “to the extent that we share a pre-theoretical, intuitive understanding
of chance, that understanding is…best captured by an anti-Humean conception.” Of course it remains
possible that our intuitive understanding of chance is just wrong. Nevertheless, deflationism’s
implications in terms of chance may be one more area where the view proves to be unattractive.
My example is derived from set theory.75 Imagine there is a universe with a single particle
floating in space. At some time t, it will be projected into a field of an infinite set of points at which it
could land. There are no additional forces or laws that dictate which of the points it is likely to land on,
just that it will land on one of them. The possibility of the particle landing at any one individual point
is 1/infinity– that is zero. So mathematically speaking, the objective probability of the particle landing
on, say, point 3000 is 0%. However, the particle must land on some point. The probability of it
landing on one of the points is 100%, yet on any one point it’s 0%.
Let’s say we run the interaction and the particle lands on point 3000. This is not surprising
necessarily because though the probability of landing on any one point is 0, it must land on one of the
points. We run it ten more times, and it happens to land on point 3000 two times out of ten.
Statistically, a regularity seems to emerge. There is a statistical frequency of the particle landing at point
75

Thank you to Julia Didziulis for helpful conversations about set theory.
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3000 in 20% of cases. Here, the statistics diverge significantly from the objective chances– there’s an
objective probability of zero for this outcome each time the interaction is run, and yet a statistical
frequency of 20%. For the inflationist, the frequency is inexplicable. The dynamics and initial
conditions permit a range of outcomes. There is no further explanation than non-deterministic
dynamics. There is no explanation because the statistical frequency is not connected to the objective
chances by a relation of dependence.
Now, a deflationist must say something quite different– and I believe something quite
revisionary. Given the BSA, when enough data has been accumulated, any statistical regularity merits
lawhood. The constraints of the Best System require that we admit any regularity whose admission
would maximize the simplicity and explanatory strength of the system as a whole. What it is to be a law
on a deflationist account is nothing more than a statistical regularity that can be stated simply and
convey great informational content. Thus, in this case, the deflationist will be pushed by the demands
of “bestness” to posit a probabilistic law describing the particle’s behavior despite the fact that the
particle’s interactions are by stipulation and by mathematical definition, not probabilistic. It doesn’t
matter how many times we run the interaction (short of infinity). The particle will have to land on at
least one point each time. For at least one point, the statistical frequency will be greater than 0% even
though we know the objective chance to be 0%. We can see mathematically that the statistics will not
match the objective chances. And yet, the deflationist will be pushed to posit a probabilistic law based
on the statistics that is in direct contradiction to the genuine objective chances.
In summary, I contend that we generally assume that if there were to be a probabilistic law
governing the interaction, it would reflect the genuine objective chances. We know the objective chance
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to be zero for any one point. And yet, on a deflationist account, we would posit a probabilistic law that
deems the chance to be above zero for at least one point. Thus, this example shows that on a
deflationist account, the probabilistic laws do not necessarily reflect the genuine objective chances
involved. This gives us a dramatically different sense of how laws serve to explain. We seem to generate
an explanation in the best system where ordinary intuitions would tell us there is none. As Hall said,
“on a normal view of chance, there will be all the difference in the world between phenomena governed
by probabilistic law and phenomena governed by merely non deterministic dynamics.”76 Inflationism
better captures this “normal view.” As such, the stakes seem high for the deflationist to show how their
view is worth the cost to intuitive views of probability.

76

Hall, N (2019, October 24). Humean Revisionism about Chance [presentation video recording]. Youtube.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I distinguished broadly between epistemologically-motivated and
non-epistemologically motivated deflationism. Arguing that the most important
epistemologically-motivated historical arguments for deflationism both require and reject IBE, I
concluded that this account faces a significant tension. If deflationists wish to mount an
epistemologically-motivated attack on nomic knowledge under inflationism, they may need to reject
the use of IBE. However, they also require some similar abductive principle to support why their claim
to parsimony is a relevant desideratum and to uphold the Best Systems Account’s internal
axiomatization method.
At first glance, Schaffer’s argument for deflationism is an improvement because it sets out to
avoid this sort of staunch empiricism, distancing itself from these flawed epistemological motivations.
And yet, Schaffer’s argument via fathomability may ultimately rest upon content empiricism. If so, his
argument has similar skeptical implications to epistemologically-motivated deflationism and
undermines his own appeal to unobservable relations of dependence. Next, I argue that the
deflationist’s advantage on ontological economy is either non-existent or marginal, in which case it is
outweighed by the superiority of inflationist explanation, prediction, and intuitive views of chance. It
is my hope that by excavating and evaluating the role epistemological concerns have played in this
debate, we may find new avenues to break this long standing metaphysical stalemate.
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AFTERWORD
ON HYDRAS AND CRAZINESS

Most philosophers, upon many points of philosophy, are still very unphilosophical…
I would have the judicious reader pause before accusing such asseverations of an undue quantum
of absurdity. Anaxagoras, it will be remembered, maintained that snow is black, and this I have
since found to be the case.

(Edgar Allan Poe, "Loss of Breath”)

In the conclusion, I summarize what I attempted to do in this thesis. Now, I’ll briefly talk
about what I have not been able to do in this thesis. I’ve found this process rather like battling a hydra;
just when I cut off one head, three more grow. Each hard-won solution produces a multiplicity of new
questions.
Here, I have sought to make a case for a view of existence where invisible things hold reality
together, and have had the audacity to argue that this view is the most intuitive one. Naturally,
questions surrounding the methodology of intuition in philosophy spring to mind. To what extent
should our philosophical views be shaped by intuition? What is intuition, and where does it come
from? In future, I hope to zoom out to some of these bigger picture questions about the contours of
the debate.
Metaphysical questions surrounding laws seem impervious to empirical data; I am of the
opinion that whether laws govern or summarize will not be settled by science, but by some process of
metaphysical inquiry. What exactly that inquiry should look like is a meta consideration I've largely left
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untouched. Should we seek an account of laws that best conforms to our existing folk intuitions about
what they are? In other words, is common sense a desiderata of the account we’re interested in? Or
should our inquiry be guided by something else? Do we have reason to believe our common sense
views of laws have some relationship to reality, or are they irrelevant to our search for metaphysical
truth?
Common sense is a hot commodity in philosophy; the right to claim it as an ally is bitterly
contested. For a group of people prone to arguing that tables don’t exist and “zombies” could,77 we
seem surprisingly concerned with whether our views are commonsensical, whatever we take that to
mean. Lewis himself, was deeply concerned with this criterion. He writes:
One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the
business of philosophy either to undermine or justify these pre-existing opinions to any
great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly
system.78
At face value, being commonsensical seems like a theoretical virtue. Why is this? Well, this itself
seems like common sense. I would be lying if I didn’t acknowledge that one of the initial factors that
drew me to inflationism was an intuition that it better accorded with common sense notions of what
lawhood is. However, I am increasingly swayed by the potentially troubling conclusion that common
sense is no guide to the metaphysical truth of laws. My view has been shaped heavily by the work of
Eric Schwitzgebel in his paper “The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind”. In this paper, Schwitzgebel argues
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Conceivably, at least, but not necessarily possibly.
Lewis (1973), 88.

53
that something “crazy” must be among the core truths about the metaphysics of mind. Here, crazy
refers to something that is contrary to common sense and not decisively supported by empirical
evidence. I am beginning to suspect that any true account of the laws of nature will similarly run
counter to common sense. More specifically, at least one of the central truths about laws of nature
must be something it would be crazy to believe.
This view rests on the notion that our folk views regarding laws of nature, that is those views
that would be considered commonsensical, contain contradictions. To give one example, we often
speak of governing laws in common speech, and yet it seems contrary to common sense to believe that
abstract entities exist. Presumably, the true theory of laws will be internally consistent. Therefore, if all
commonsensical views are internally inconsistent, a true theory of lawhood will defy common sense in
some way. Thus, at least one of the central truths about laws will be “crazy” in the way Schwitzgebel
describes. Since the available contenders are all “crazy” in this sense, Schwitzgebel concludes that we are
not epistemically compelled to believe any one of them in particular. Therefore, we are not
epistemically obliged to believe the correct metaphysical theory.
It is at this latter point that I diverge from Schwitzgebel. In future, I hope to develop a means
of salvaging our epistemic obligation to believe the truth about laws, regardless of “craziness.” I am
interested in seeking a criterion of “uncommon sense” upon which to base our epistemic obligations.
This principle would not be rooted in empirical evidence or folk intuitions about common sense, but
rather systematic considerations, perhaps undergirded by the principle of sufficient reason. This idea is
in its incipient stages but I hope that pursuing this line will help us adjudicate between equally “crazy”
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theories and preserve our epistemic obligation to believe the truth, no matter how “crazy” it may turn
out to be. Down the rabbit hole we go.
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